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STATUTORY PROCEDURES GOVERNING JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION:
FROM STATE WRITS TO ARTICLE 78
OF THE CIVIL PRACTICE LAW
AND

RULES *

HAROLD WMNTRAUB

t

MANDAMUS

The

introductory

note

to

the provisions

governing

mandamus in the Code of Civil Procedure, which became
effective September 1, 1880,1 described the existing provisions
of the Revised Statutes on the subject as "very meager."2
This is truly an understatement if we recall the seven bare
statutory sections which had to suffice to guide and to govern
the great variety and large volume of mandamus actions
in the pre-Civil Code periodY The members of the Throop
Commission 4 were acutely aware of this fact and set out
in earnest to rectify the omission. Where the chief draftsman of the 1848 Code of Procedure, David Dudley Field,

had concentrated on stating the general rules which should
govern,5 The Throop Code was drafted upon the principle

that detailed precision must be established for each stage
of the mandamus proceeding.
* This paper is part of a study entitled, "Development of Judicial Review
of Administrative Action in New York," submitted in partial satisfaction of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science at New
York University School of Law. The guidance of Professor Bernard
Schwartz of the School of Law throughout the period of preparation of
this study is gratefully acknowledged.
t The author is a member of the New York Bar; awarded LL.B.,
St. John's University School of Law; LL.M., New York University School
of Law; J.S.D., New York University School of Law. He serves as an
attorney for the New York City Housing Authority.
I2 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1880, ch. 178, § 3356.
REVisERs' PREU MINARY NOTE TO THE NEW YORK CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, ch. 16, art. 4 [hereinafter cited as CCP Rpv. NoTE].
3 N.Y. REV. STAT. (1859) Pt. III, ch. 9, tit. 2, art. 3, §§ 54-60.
4 So designated after its chairman and chief draftsman, Montgomery
Throop.
5 3 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS AND M-WISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY
FILsD 234-235 (Coan ed. 1890).
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After allowing the courts to proceed virtually unhindered for one hundred years in working out the procedures for the writ, the time was finally considered ripe
for codification because the avalanche of mandamus litigation
had also brought a great diffusion and diversity of practice
and procedure, uncontrolled by a central source or authority.
Questions of practice rarely reached the highest court,
allowing differences to grow up in the various judicial
divisions of the state.
Although a revolutionary change had been effected by
the Field Code of 1848 in abolishing the common-law forms
of action and simplifying the rules of practice and pleading,
the procedure for mandamus was specifically preserved by
that portion of the code which was enacted into law.6
ConbB OF CIVIL PROCEDUILRB

The codifiers of 1870, finding that the "rules of law,
defining the cases where the writs may issue . . . have
been tolerably well settled," directed their exclusive attention to practice and procedure, and stated that "no material alteration" was made "in the general plan and framework of the original system.' '
First, the writs which English courts had denominated
as prerogative writs were now placed into a new classification called "state writs," with the addition of the writ
of assessment of damages. This followed the recommendation of the Field Commission in its final report which
substituted the term state writ for prerogative writ in
belated recognition of the absence of royal prerogative at
this point in our history.8 Also, in accordance with
legislative direction, Latin terms for the writs themselves
had been supplanted by the Field Commission by writ of
review of inferior jurisdictions (certiorari) and writ of
mandate (mandamus), among others, 9 but was not followed
by the later codifiers.
6 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1848, ch. 379, § 390; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1849, ch. 438.
7CCP REv. NoTE.
8 COMPLETE REPORT OF THE COBIMISSIONERS

cited as COMPLETE REPORT OF 1850].
9 Id. at § 1266.

OF

1850 § 1264 [hereinafter

88
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General procedures applicable to all of these writs,
viz., habeas corpus, certiorari to inquire into the cause of
detention, mandamus, prohibition, assessment of damages,
certiorari to review the determination of an inferior tribunal,
under varying conditions, were specified."0 This could have
been the precursor of article 78 but was lacking a sufficient
body of rules. In particular, the final determination was
styled by section 1997 a final order, and the practice provisions of the Code relating to amendments, motions and
intermediate orders as in an action were made applicable
to these special proceedings.
Although the codifiers disclaimed the intention of
making any material alteration in the prior system, only
six of the twenty-four new mandamus sections represent the
basic provisions of the former Revised Statutes." Writs
of mandamus are declared to be "either alternative or
peremptory" 1 and "may be granted upon an affidavit, or
other written proof showing a proper case therefor" with
or without notice.'
As a practical matter the service of
notice of application for a writ did not matter too much
because the writ itself was and from earliest time had
functioned in the nature of an order to show cause. Sharply
departing from the practice followed in regard to certiorari,
no effort was made to define substantially the occasion or
circumstance for allowing the writ; the revisers were satisfied to allow the courts to continue to issue the writ
in a "proper case." Ultimately, this proved of immense
significance in the development of this writ allowing it
to later evolve as a mechanism for challenging government
action involving the exercise of discretion in matters not
reviewable by certiorari. On the other hand, the unadopted
Code of the Field Commission had specifically defined, albeit
quite broadly, the appropriate occasion for the issuance of
the writ, "to compel the performance of an act, which the
law specifically enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office,
trust or station." The Field provision did not end there
10 N.Y. CoDE OF Civ. PROc. §§ 1992-2007 [hereinafter cited as CCP].
1 CCP §§ 2073, 2082, 2084, 2088-90.
12 See also COMPLETE- REPORT oF 1850 § 1285.
13 CCP § 2067.
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but took cognizance of prevailing substantive law in codifying
the current concept that the writ "cannot control judicial
discretion." 1 The former part of this proposal was, a
century later, substantially introduced into article 78. 1
Under the common law, prior to 1873, the writ only
ran to inferior bodies and jurisdictions. However, in that
year,' 6 it was authorized to be directed to any judge holding
a special term of the supreme court or acting as a judge
of that court. The writ was to be issued in such case
by the general term, to avoid the necessity of one supreme
court's justice granting a writ against another justice of
the court. This provision was incorporated into the Code.
A peremptory writ may be applied for where the applicant believes, and shows in his papers and by a proper
notice, that the "right to the mandamus depends only upon
questions of law," and in such case the court will treat
as true only such allegations of the writ as are undisputed. 8
The revisers' notes to section 2070 stress that the granting
of a peremptory mandamus, in the first instance, is uncommon except in an urgent case.
The person or persons served with the writ were given
the option of filing a return which could incorporate denials
and defenses of new matter as in an action, or could file
a demurrer as if addressed to a complaint. The alternative
writ could not be quashed nor set aside on motion on any
question involving the merits. 9
Although a further return could not now be compelled
under the Code, a departure from the prior procedure followed under common-law mandamus, the relator
could demur
20
to the return as being insufficient in law.
Issues of fact are defined with utmost simplicity, as
arising from a denial or an allegation of new matter contained in a return, unless a demurrer is taken. The re14 COmPLE

RFPORT OF 1850 § 1283.

N.Y. Civ. PAc. AcT § 1296(1) [hereinafter cited as CPA].
16 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1873, ch. 70.
17 CCP § 2069.
18 People ex rel. Corrigan v. The Mayor, 149 N.Y. 215, 43 N.E. 554
(1896) (construing CCP § 2070).
19 CCP §§ 2075-77.
15

20 CCP § 2078.
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visers state that a reply is not necessary.'
Oral pleadings
are abolished and all pleading must follow this article.2 2
After issue is joined, the proceedings are the same as in an
action, and the writ and return are deemed pleadings therein,
following the principles of the Field Code of 1850. The
final order is the same as a final judgment and may be
docketed as such.2 3
Returning to issues of fact, once issue is joined upon
an alternative writ, it must be tried by a jury as in an
action unless a jury trial is waived or consent made to a
reference.2" Although a relator may prevail upon an issue
of fact raised in an alternative mandamus, he is not thereby
entitled to a peremptory mandamus when there is no legal
basis in the record to award the writ to him.2 5 Section
2083 also incorporates the early statutory provision that
the relator may recover damages as if the issues were
joined in an action against defendant for making a false
return, which would of itself have presented a rather difficult
and unieldly cause of action. Where an alternative mandamus has been awarded, costs are to be awarded as in an
action; if a peremptory mandamus is granted without a
prior alternative mandamus, costs, not exceeding fifty dollars and disbursements may be awarded to either party,
as upon a motion.2" The fifty dollar limitation has remained
in effect to this day. Where a peremptory mandamus has
issued without a prior alternative writ, the appeal is
taken as from a final order in a special proceeding; however,
where there has been an alternative mandamus, the appeal
is taken as from a judgment.2 7 The guidelines followed here
were the standards established for motion practice (peremptory mandamus) and for trial (alternative mandamus).
Although the revisers' note states that section 2083
makes provision that the relator may be awarded damages
21 CCP Rev. Ngte § 2079.

22 CCP § 2080.
23 CCP § 2082.
24 CCP § 2083.

25 People ex rel. D.W. & P.R.R. v. Batchellor, 53 N.Y. 128, 137 (1873);
People
ex rel. Hanrahan v. Metropolitan Bd. of Police, 26 N.Y. 316 (1863).
2

6 CCP § 2086.

27 CCP § 2087.
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as in an action on a false return, section 2088 repeats this
provision verbatim.
This is typical of the considerable
amount of overlapping and surplusage of wordage throughout the mandamus article.
Appropriate authority and discretion for granting a
stay in the mandamus proceeding and for an enlargement
of time in other respects is also provided.28 Where the
court is convinced that the public officer or body against
whom a peremptory mandamus is awarded has without
just excuse refused or neglected to perform the duty enjoined
in the proceeding, it may impose a fine not exceeding
$250 in addition to awarding relator his damages and costs.
It has been ruled that this fine relates and is confined to
inexcusable neglect of duty which occurred before the issuance of the writ.2"
The extended disquisitions in the opinions of the courts
prior to the adoption of the Code in regard to prerogative
writ procedures plainly betrayed the fact that the commonlaw intricacies of pleading and practice on these writs had
not been adequately mastered.
The influx of new uses
to which the writs were applied added, moreover, to the
confusion. The bare bones of the Revised Statutes had failed
to keep pace with and provide answers to these new
problems, and the revisers sought in this article to restore
a basis for order and uniformity in dealing with these
uncertainties and new demands.
They prescribed, in the main, from existing commonlaw practice, that the peremptory writ could be granted
in the first instance where only a question of law was
raised. The alternative writ would issue either where the
peremptory writ itself, improvidently issued, showed that a
question of fact existed, or where the relator in the first
instance employed that mode of proceeding because he con2

8 CCP § 2089.

People ex rel. Garbutt v. R. & S.L.R.R., 76 N.Y. 294 (1879), derived
from 3 N.Y. Rev. Stat. (1829) ch. 587, § 60. According to the revisers'
note on the Revised Statutes, this provision was not originally proposed by
them but was inserted by the legislature. It was presumably patterned upon
29

an existing penalty imposed on a supervisor neglecting to perform duties
incumbent upon him and was intended "To save further action, and to ensure
the performance of public duties."
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sidered that a question of fact existed to be tried. The
defendant was required to serve and file a return, unless
he decided to demur to an alternative writ or move to quash
a peremptory writ. The pleadings and the practice were
to be assimilated to that of an action, after the service
of the return, as far as it-was consistent with the mandamus
article. After the return was filed to an alternative mandamns which showed that an issue of fact existed, it was
to be tried by a jury unless waived. The relator who
prevailed was entitled to a peremptory mandamus directing
that a public duty enjoined by law be performed. He was
entitled also to an assessment of damages if he showed
that the return was falsified; to be awarded any other
damages which he sustained, and to costs and disbursements.
The court could impose, in addition, a fine not exceeding
$250 for an unreasonable refusal to perform the duty
found incumbent upon the defendant in the action. Although
provision is made for a stay of the mandamus proceedings
in order to maintain the parties in status quo while an
appeal is taken, there is none made in the first instance
for staying the action of the public body or officer while
the mandamus proceeding is pending undecided. There is
no statute of limitations prescribed for the time in which
a proceeding is to be brought on. This omission was based
on the likely theory that mandamus resembled an action,
and in any event, the court retained discretion under the
common-law decisions to refuse the writ where it considered that an ex.cessive period of time had been allowed
to elapse.
Such was the substance of the new enactment which
addressed itself exclusively to matters of procedure. The
basis for awarding the writ would continue to be governed
by common-law principles derived from the case law. The
article made no visible attempt to set forth any substantive
conditions for awarding or denying mandamus. However,
the new problem of ferreting out and correlating the various
provisions of the mandamus article had now replaced the
problem of the lack of adequate statutory provisions. The
sfttte did not follow a logical and chronological sequence
and provisions frequently overlapped, creating further con-
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fusion. The large volume of mandamus actions which flowed
into the courts at this period required simple, clear and
concise rules to obviate pitfalls for the uninitiated and
to speed the action to an ultimate decision on the merits,
if at all possible. A start had been made in providing
statutory guides, but in turn, the new statutory aids had
to be mastered if the hoped-for benefit was to be realized.
CERTIORARI
Where doubt and confusion had previously prevailed
in regard to the common-law procedure surrounding the
writ of mandamus, there was conflict and uncertainty in
the law in regard to the circumstances when issuance of a
writ of certiorari was legally justified 0 Basically a mode
of reviewing judicial action of judicial and nonjudicial
tribunals, both statutory and non-statutory, the uses of
certiorari, by pressure of rising demands resulting from
rapidly changing conditions, had extended its function far
beyond its original purpose of examining jurisdiction.
The codifiers spoke of this in their preliminary note
on the certiorari article. It was their opinion that statutes
relating to special proceedings had made the appeal provisions of the Code also applicable to cases previously
reviewed by certiorari. They leaned strongly towards codifying this vieswpoint and to dispense with treating certiorari
altogether, but finally resolved upon a separate article for
certiorari in considering "the risk of doing more harm
than good by the change." It would appear, therefore, that
the ancient writ of certiorari for review of official action had
hovered close to extinction as this part of the Code of Civil
Procedure was in the process of formulation. It would
appear also that the revisers had taken the right tack in
considering abolition of the writ, but for the wrong reasons.
Although the old writ system had outlived its usefulness, the
subiect matter of certiorari writ review could not be equated
to judicial action by a judicial tribunal, warranting full
assimilation for review of such administration action as
30 CCP

REv. Nos; CCP § 2140.
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upon appeal. The narrow technicalities then common to
our law, and the broad spectrum of judicial action immune
to revision upon appeal would have been imported with full
force in regard to an area where tradition had not as yet
elevated the transactions involved to the status of a
judicial transaction. A large number of these actions would
thereby have been placed beyond the reach of practical
judicial review. In addition, this would have occurred at a
time when mandamus allowed but cursory judicial review,
and certiorari was the remaining bastion of relief for testing
the fairness and the legality of administrative action. Although the test for review by certiorari was theoretically
based upon judicial action, the lines between judicial and
administrative action had not as yet been clearly drawn.
What emerges for us today as a matter of central
interest is that certiorari was close to extinction because it
was considered to be a writ which resembled an appeal in
almost all respects. This view had ample support in the
Revised Statutes where statutory certiorari was placed between the article "Of Writs of Error" and another "Of
Appeals from the Court of Chancery," all of them falling
under the title of "Of Writs of Error and Appeals."'"
Consistent with the viewpoint that certiorari resembled an
appeal, the provisions of the Code relating to the writ were
tailored towards that end, assimilating all the possible
methods of the appeal process. However, even more than
in the case of mandamus, the Code drew heavily upon the
leading cases which had gained acceptance and currency
by the cogency of their decisions, creating -a body of substantive certiorari law where isolated decisions without definitive authority had existed before. This body of viable
certiorari law had moved rapidly in many directions in the
decades just prior to the adoption of the Code.
In addition, certiorari was a familiar writ, having been
extensively employed in conjunction with the writ of habeas
corpus; 82 to review actions from mayors' courts;" a to
Pt. III, ch. 9.
(1859) Pt. III, ch. 9, tit. 1, art. 2.
(1859) Pt. III, ch. 7, tit. 2.

3' N.Y. REv. STAT. (1859)
82

3

N.Y. REv.
N.Y. REv.

STAT.
STAT.
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remove decisions for review under absconding debtors' acts ;84
to review awards by canal appraisers; 1r to review complaints
of entry and detainer; 36 to review summary proceedings
for recovery of possession of land." It is readily apparent,
therefore, that in establishing general statutory procedures
for certiorari as a mechanism of review there was ample
precedent. Although some of the statutory certiorari proceedings referred to were self-sufficient in prescribing the
entire procedure to be followed, a general statute for common-law certiorari had long been needed because there
were no general statutory provisions applicable at that time.
The preliminary note of the codifiers specifically emphasizes
that the provisions of the article would "therefore be confined to a common-law certiorari," in "defining the jurisdiction of the court to issue a certiorari." However, in
those situations where statutory certiorari made no special
provision in respect to matters touched by the certiorari
article, the latter would apply and govern.
The writ is defined as a means of reviewing a determination of a body or officer."8 It can be issued only where
authorized expressly by statute, or where it may be issued
at common law and the right to the writ is not expressly
taken away by statute.8" It cannot be issued, as it had in
the past, to review a determination made in a civil action
or in a special proceeding in a court of record. 0 Falling
back on decisional law, it was also established that it
cannot issue (1) to review a determination which is not
final; (2) where it can be adequately re'viewed by appeal
to a court or some body or officer; or (3) where there was
a riaht to request a rehearing, unless a rehearing was had
or the time for it had expired.
The writ is allowed to
issue out of courts other than the supreme court; by a
court of record exercising appellate functions to bring up
34 N.Y. RPV. STAT.
35
8 N.Y. REv. STAT.
6 N.Y. REV. STAT.
37 N.Y. REv. STAT.
38 CCP §2120.

39 Ibid.

40 CCP § 2121.
Ibid.

41

(1859)
(1859)
(1859)
(1859)

Pt. III, ch. 9, tit. 3, art. 2.
Pt. I, ch. 9, tit. 9, art. 3.
Pt. III, ch. 8, tit. 10, art. 1.
Pt. III, ch. 8, tit. 10, art. 2.
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additional data or to correct a defect in the record before
the court.42 This latter proviso is of arresting interest
because the earliest beginnings of certiorari were primarily
concerned with the ancillary function of supplying data
to a higher tribunal or officer. Acting upon the premise
that certiorari was akin to an appeal, the codifiers set
a period of four months as the time in which the proceeding.
was to be brought. 43 This was a new provision and the
explanatory note to this section observed that the period
here prescribed was twice the period of time allowed for
taking an appeal from an order under the Code. It recognized that the varying periods of limitation prescribed by
various statutes will continue to be applicable to such
statutory certiorari proceedings. The period of limitation
was qualified by the following section which listed nonage, insanity or imprisonment as grounds for an extension
44
of time up. to twenty months for bringing on the writ.
The writ is to be applied for by or in behalf of the
person aggrieved by the determination to be reviewed and
must be founded upon an affidavit or a verified petition, or
other proof showing a proper case for the intervention of
certiorari relief. The granting or refusal of the writ45
is expressly made a matter of discretion with the court,
again incorporating decisional law on a statutory point.
Inasmuch as the writ was a court order necessary to institute the proceediifg, vesting discretion in the court in
regard to its issuance differentiated it sharply from an
appeal which could, in the first instance, normally be taken
as of right. Also, noteworthy is the requirement that a
petitioner must show himself aggrieved, i.e., have standing,
before the court would authorize issuance of the writ. Sharp
distinctions between certiorari and mandamus are now being
codified, in the light of the different purposes to which the
writs had been applied in the recent past.
The next several sections present matters of procedure
as to notice, nomenclature of defendants and mode of
42

CCP

§§ 2123-24.

43 CCP § 2125.
44 CCP § 2126.

45CCP § 2127.

1963 ]

REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

97

service.4 6 In recognition of the importance of the matters
coming within the purview of certiorari, and notably absent
in the mandamus article, provision is made for authorizing
a stay of the determination to be reviewed, according to the
court's discretion and upon suitable undertaking."
In regard to the return, it is required that a transcript
of the record of the proceedings be annexed together with
other matters specified in the writ.48 The earlier cases had
not required that verbatim evidence be included in the return
because jurisdiction could be determined without it, but
this Code requirement now accorded recognition to the
enlarged scope of review allowed by certiorari.
The Code stated that: "if a return is defective, the
court may direct a further return." 4 9 But the long standing
rule of case law that the facts in the return were conclusive and could not be contradicted was perpetuated by
statute.5 0 This was an anachronism which had been mitigated
in mandamus long earlier and could have been wiped out
in certiorari by allowing the relator to request a further
return."' It was also provided that "a person, specially and
beneficially interested in upholding a determintion" could
be admitted as a party defendant in the discretion of the
court, subject to such terms as justice required."
Indicative of the importance attached to this type of
proceeding and to the fact that it was to be treated on a
par with an appeal, is the provision which directs that
the cause be heard at a general term of the supreme court; "
the general term was shortly succeeded by the appellate
division as the intermediate court of appeal in the state.
Another section, consonant with the practice formerly followed in respect to writs of error, authorized the receipt
of additional affidavits or written proof from either party
relating to any alleged error of fact or question of fact
46 CCP § 2128-30.
47 CCP § 2132.
48 CCP § 2134.
49 CCP § 2135.

50 People ex rel. Miller v. Wurster, 149 N.Y. 549, 44 N.E. 298 (1896).
51 Cf. CoMPLm

52 CCP § 2137.
53 CCP § 2138.

REPoRT OF 1850

§ 1280.
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essential to the jurisdiction of the body or the officer to
make the determination, where the facts are not sufficiently
stated in the return. 4
Section 2140 was the most significant and lasting contribution made by the codifiers in the field of administrative
law. By this section full recognition was extended to "the
labors of a small number of judges whose vision was not
limited by the boundaries of precedent. Exhibiting a broad
grasp of current practices which had left much of administrative adjudication free from judicial review, these
men had issued decisions which gradually brought such
action within the folds of the common law. In this manner,
modified but effective common-law standards of judicial review were thereafter to be applicable by means of certiorari.
In addition to the traditional tests of examining whether
there was jurisdiction and regularity in the proceedings,
these pioneering judicial decisions were utilized to enlarge
the scope of review by statute to embrace the basic constituents of a fair trial. The enduring value of these provisions is amply demonstrated by their retention, in the
virtual original terminology, through several revisions of
our practice codes. A clear-cut, palpable standard for
measuring and evaluating the propriety of judicial action
taken by an administrative body or officer had been promulgated for the guidance of the courts and the administrators alike. 55
Section 2140 prescribed that the scope of review upon
certiorari was to be determined and tested in accordance
with the following standards:
1.
2.

Whether the body or officer had jurisdiction of the
subject-matter of the determination under review.
Whether the authority, conferred upon the body
or officer, in relation to that subject matter, has
been pursued in the mode required by law, in order
to authorize it or him to make a determination.

CCP § 2139.
55 The Field Code of 1850 predated these important decisions and there54

fore confined its proposed scope of review to jurisdiction and regularity;
cf.

COmPLTm

REPoRT OF

1850 §§ 1275-76.
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Whether, in making the determination, any rule of
law, affecting the rights of the parties thereto, has
been violated, to the prejudice of the relator.
Whether there was any competent proof of all
the facts, necessary to be proved, in order to
authorize the making of the determination.
If there was such proof, whether there was, upon
all the evidence, such a preponderance of proof,
against the existence of any of those facts, that the
verdict of a jury, affirming the existence thereof,
rendered in an action in the supreme court, triable
by a jury, would be set aside by the court, as
against the weight of the evidence.

The law of certiorari had finally been emancipated
from the loose generalities of the early decisions, i.e., jurisdiction and regularity, some of which had paid lip service to
the rights of the plaintiffs and concluded by awarding judgments to the defendants. A clear rule of law had been
established for testing the validity of official action in the
nature of a judicial determiantion, which would enable
the courts to focus their review upon appropriate questions
of legality. All the errors of omission and commission which
critics of the 'Code later heaped upon the revisers are somehow mitigated by this exceptional achievement of legislating
fair play into administrative judicial determinations, albeit
by indirection. This was the first time that a substantive
test of the actions of administrative bodies upon judicial
review had been placed in a general statute.
Disregarding decisional law in the next instance, 6 the
article further provided that the reviewing court may make
a final order annulling or confirming, wholly or partly, or
modifying the determination; another provision patterned
upon the powers of the appellate courts.5
To supplement
the authority granted in the preceding section, the reviewing
court was also given power to award restitution in like
manner as upon an appeal5 s It is an irony of legal de56 People ex tel. Robinson v. Ferris,
57 CCP § 2141; cf. CCP § 1337.

58 CCP

§2142.

36 N.Y. 218 (1867).
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velopment that although the writ of mandamus may owe
part of its paternity to the equally ancient writ of restitution, 9 the mandamus article does not contain a corresponding
provision regarding restitution. Costs of fifty dollars, together with disbursements, may be awarded in the discretion
of the court.60
To complete the article, definitions of "body," "officer,"
and "determination" are given which elaborate but do not
truly elucidate because the central feature of certiorari
review, the nature of the judicial act, is not defined.6 1
Also, all procedures in existing statutes providing for the
issuance of certiorari in express cases are preserved. 2
The article is expressly made inapplicable to determinations
made in any criminal matter, except criminal contempt of
63
court.
Questions of tax assessments and tax valuation had
frequently occupied the courts in certiorari proceedings, and
by separate statute, the right to review such action by
certiorari was extended to such matters in the same year
as this article became effective. 4 Tax certiorari, as provided
by Section 2147 of the Code, was to be governed by its own
statutory provisions. The scope of review in such cases
was enlarged by statute to permit a re-determination in
the reviewing court of questions of fact and also for the
taldn of additional testimony. 65
Considerable effort went into the creation of the first
general statutes governing mandamus and certiorari procpedinas.
Much that was beneficial resulted from this
notable effort. Before the adoption of the Code provisions,
it was regarded as a formidable task for the average lawyer of the
time to acquaint himself with the procedure in special proceedings,
59 See the writer's dissertation on file in New York University School
AcTIoN IN
NEw YORK 18-20, 23-28.
60 CCP § 2143.
of Law, DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL REVEw OF ADmINISTRATIVE

61 CCP
62 CCP
63 CCP
64 N.Y.

§2146.
§ 2147.
§ 2148.
Sess. Laws 1880, ch. 269.
65 People ex rel. Manhattan Ry. v. Barker, 152 N.Y. 417. 46 N.E. 875
(1897); People ex rel. Troy Union R.R. v. Carter, 52 Hun 458,
aff'd, 117 N.Y. 625, 22 N.E. 1128 (1889).
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because the rules of law thereon had to be gathered from text books,
statutes and a great many decisions, which were often in conflict
and hopelessly confused.6

It may appear that a more imaginative effort by the
revisers might have led to a broader definition of the
functions of mandamus. Although the rule of absolute discretion sounds quite harsh to us today, it was in complete
harmony with contemporary case law. :More important,
such a statutory definition might have prevented the development of the writ on the broader basis which ultimately
emerged thirty years later. In certiorari there could have
been a better definition of judicial action, which is the
subject of the writ, because the courts had fumbled with
the problem for a long time and were hardly closer to
a solution in 1880 than they were at the beginning. Perhaps that is a measure of the difficulty to be resolved in
framing an all-inclusive but precise definition of judicial
action. The judges in the post-Civil War period were the
first to attempt to mark out the limits for scope of review in
certiorari by assimilating administrative judicial activity to
judicial action per se. They were so conspicuously successful that these codified common-law standards have remained in our law to this day. At best, the effort to
lay down ground rules open to all who would consult
the statute book was a vast improvement over the hazards
and uncertainties faced earlier in seeking to locate and
choose the applicable rule of law from the welter of judicial
decisions which were sometimes in conflict with each other.
In time, the confusion, incongruities and verbosity of the
Code would be smoothed out.
The solid achievement attained in codifying the writ
procedure for mandamus and certiorari was, however, generally overlooked in the barrage of criticism which soon
descended against the mass of detail and poor arrangement
of the new Code as a whole, consisting, as it did, of 3356
66 1937 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 48, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
COUNCIL

140 [hereinafter cited as

THIRD ANNUAL

REPORT].

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 38

sections. 7 J. Newton Fiero, Dean of Albany Law School
and Chairman of the Committee on Law Reform of the
New York State Bar Association, submitted proposals to
the 1895 annual meeting of the Association for Simplification
of the State Writ Procedure. In the main, the alternative
and peremptory writs were to be abolished, substituting
orders for the writs on the plain premise that a writ was
a relic of English practice emanating from the royal prerogative and no longer suited to our legal system. This
plan also urged the amalgamation, in the interests of
simplicity and uniformity, under one head, of all provisions relating to mandamus, certiorari and prohibition, ancestor of the article 78 concept. 8 The report was approved
but the necessary legislative support did not eventuate.
Fiero continued to drum away at his objectives and
at the 1899 meeting of the Association again presented proposals for the revision of the Code with particular emphasis
on the writs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. 9
As a former president, and again as Chairman of the Committee on Law Reform of the Association, he urged that
it was "absolutely necessary some action should be taken" 70
because the Code provisions were "crude, diffuse, badly
arranged and illy adapted," and the precedents "serve rather
to cloud its meaning than to assist in its interpretation." 71
In addition, "the Legislature will not let it alone," having
enacted 432 amendments in the fifteen years since its adoption; adding that "the present New York Code . . . has
been aptly characterized as revision gone mad."'
Chief
Judge Alton B. Parker of the New York Court of Ap67 REPORT OF CoitITTrE ON LAW REFORM, 5 N.Y.S.B.A.R. 60 (1881),
which is a general attack upon the Code as an attempt to frame a body
of law which is-neither a correct statement of the common-law decisions nor
an accurate re-enactment of the statute law. (The writer is indebted to the
painstaking research contained in the THIRD ANNUAL REPORT for much of
'what follows).
68Fiero, Proposed Revision, the Code of Civil Procedure Relative to
Certiorari,Mandamus and Prohibition. 18 N.Y.S.B.A.R. 194-212 (1895).
69 REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON LAW REFORM, 22 N.Y.S.B.A.R. 161-180, 233251 (1899).
70 Id. at 161.
71 Id. at 172.
72 Id. at 174-75.
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peals called the Code a "legal monstrosity;"'" that it
restored "many of the objectionable features of the common-law practice which the original code [of 18481 was
intended to eliminate. This is more especially the case with
reference to special proceedings." 74 The state writ proceedings were considered to be, in view of the stream of
proposals for their revision, in special need of condensation
and simplification. But, periodic resolutions and detailed
recommendations by the INew York State Bar Association
failed to evoke the necessary corrective action by the legislature, except for the appointment of another commission
on code revision in 1895. 75
A drastic proposal for the revision of the practice in
special proceedings, including the state writs, was made
by the Board of Statutory Consolidation in 1915. It
was recommended to the legislature, in conjunction with a
complete overhauling of the Code, that almost all special
proceedings be abolished and replaced with a remedy by
action.78
Although this plan was considered by one authority
to be "only a continuation of the reform effected by the
Code of 1848," 7 it went far beyond Field's proposals of
1850 by abolishing the special proceedings entirely, including
the state writs, which that unadopted code retained in
The Board of 1915 had determined
separate chapters."
to make a complete break with the past and it substituted
a streamlined Civil Practice Act of only 71 sections and
401 rules for the Code's 3384 sections which were in effect
in 1914. It proposed to reduce certiorari to just four
sections in a new Civil Rights Law, retaining the substance
of Section 2140 of the Code and the limitations upon review;
mandamus was virtually obliterated except for a single
73 Id. at 177.
74 Id. at 180.

75 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1895, ch. 1036.
THE CommIssiowms OF CODE REVISION

The report of this body, REPORT OF
63, agreed "That our civil procedure

ought to be revised," but proceeded to do nothing about it.
761 REPORT OF BOARD OF

STATUTORY

CONSOLIDATION

OF THE CIVIL PRACTICE IN NEW YORK 168
BOARD
REPORT].
77
THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 143.
78 CoISPLrTE REPORT OF 1850 at 531; see

(1915)

ON

SIMPLIFICATION

[hereinafter referred to as
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provision to authorize recovery of damages in a mandamus
action.7 9 In effect, the substantive code provisions of certiorari were retained, and almost all else in mandamus and
certiorari was to be assimilated to the practice and procedure followed in an action."'
The Board's recommendations of 1915, which conscientiously sought to provide answers to a long pressing need,
went too far to the opposite extreme by extirpating all traces
of Code practice and procedure, and its proposals went unheeded. A tremendous amount of effort and research of
considerable value had gone to waste by reason of the
Board's intense desire to correct the utter chaos and confusion of the Code. In making a complete break with the
past it lost the opportunity to effect some essential much
needed reforms.
Although commissions, committees and boards had persevered in seeking a solution to this demanding problem, and
Field, Fiero and others had unstintingly toiled to provide
concrete proposals for simplifying mandamus and certiorari
practice, their energy, scholarship and earnestness achieved
almost nothing. A minor revision of the Code in 1915 authorized a court to allow a certiorari or mandmus proceeding to be amended where it appeared that the other
remedy, i.e., either mandamus or certiorari, was in fact
81
the proper one under the facts alleged in the papers,
but that was all.
Although the Board of Statutory Consolidation entirely
failed of its purpose, it had directed attention once again
to the need for code revision. Meanwhile, mounting criticism
of the entire Code of Civil Procedure now made revision
imperative. In 1920, under the aegis of a Joint Legislative
Committee on the Simplification of Civil Practice, which had
been named to consider the recommendations of the Board
of Statutory Consolidation, the Code was supplanted in its
entirety by the Civil Practice Act.8 2 The Committee re79 3 BOARD REPORT 169; proposed N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS
proposed N.Y. CIv. PRAC. RuLE 87.
80 Cf. COmPLETE REPORT OF 1850 §§ 1033, 1036.
81 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1915, ch. 231.
82 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1920, ch. 925.
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jected the proposals of the Board almost completely, although the latter had given long study and careful consideration to the many problems of Code practice.
CIVIL PRACTICE AcT
In its report to the legislature, the Committee noted
that one of the criticisms of the Throop Code was the
perpetuation of state writs as special proceedings instead of
their assimilation to the practice and procedure of actions.
It answered this by stating: "Our system of practice has
been an evolution. Important changes should be made only
after careful study and mature consideration." 83 It conceded that "The practice should be made less rigid in some
respects," 11 and then proceeded to re-enact the mandamus
and certiorari provisions of the Code with but minor changes.
According to one authority, this "did not represent much
of an improvement over the Code, in respect to the provisions governing the remedies of certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition." 85 The only significant change "was the substitution of a verified petition and an order for the corresponding affidavit and writ of the Code." 88 Proceedings
were no longer brought and entitled in the name of the
"People." In the words of another authority on pleading
and practice, the change effected by the Civil Practice Act
in "regard to proceedings instituted by State writ seems
simply a matter of detail." 87 The zeal and the efforts
of a long line of legal reformers, who had given years of
study to the problem, had gone for naught by the simple
fiat of this particular legislative committee. In regard
to state writs, the substitution of the Civil Practice Act
for the Code of Civil Procedure was a fiction if there was
any intent to convey the idea that substantial reforms had
been effected thereby.
831919 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 111, REPORT OF THE JOINT
COMMaITTEE ON THE SIMPLIFICATION OF CIVIL PRACTICE 27-28.
84 Id. at 30.
85
THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 143.

LEGISLATIVE

86 Ibid.
87
Alden, The New Cizil Practice Act and Rules, LEcTuREs ON LEGAL
Topics 249 (1921-1922) (auspices of Association of the Bar of the City
of New York). See also 10 CARMODY, PLEADING AND PACCE 2 (1934).
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The retention of separate provisions for proceedings in
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, almost a century
after the Field Code had abolished the several common-law
forms of action, remained a glaring anomaly. The dead
hand of the past laid a heavy yoke upon a suitor seeking
relief against government action. Instituting a mandamus
or certiorari proceeding was a special hazard because the
suit often had to work its way to the Court of Appeals
before the hapless suitor discovered that he had chosen
the wrong one of the two possible remedies, and now was
without relief at all.8
The Judicial Council of the State
of New York, after a careful study, issued a report in 1937
which meticulously marshalled the evidence, demonstrating
in case after case how outmoded and unjust the Civil
Practice Act provisions were in regard to certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. 9 The report cited practices and
procedures which were confused, conflicting and contradictory.
The report showed that the application of the remedies
of certiorari and mandamus by the courts, including the
Court of Appeals, was uncertain and almost arbitrary.
A
great number of cases are cited and analyzed to indicate
that the harassed suitor had no way of knowing when he
selected certiorari as his remedy, based upon the highest
authority, that after two appeals the court could determine
that mandamus was the only appropriate remedy and he
had lost his rights to judicial review.9" The same dilemma
existed with respect to prohibition, injunction and quo
warranto, posing unfathomable pitfalls to the prospective
litigant in regard to the choice of remedy.
In mandamus, the petitioner was required, before he
even had the benefit of the respondent's return, to decide
whether a question of law or a question of fact was primarily
involved for determination by the court. In the case of the
88 TIRn

ANNUAL

REPORT

154-56.

See, e.g.,

People ex rel

R. &

3. Co. v. Wiggins, 199 N.Y. 382, 92 N.E. 789 (1910); see also cases noted
in note 90 infra.

89 THRD ANNUAL REPORT

133-98.

90 Compare People ex rel. Schau v. McWilliams, 185 N.Y. 92, 77 N.E.
785 (1906), wfth People ex rel. Sims v. Collier, 175 N.Y. 196, 67 N.E. 309
(1903).
9
1 Txn ANNUAL REPORT 144-56.
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former, he requested a peremptory order, and for the question of fact situation he sought an alternative order. Although the courts were liberal in allowing alternative orders
of mandamus to issue where a peremptory order had been
mistakenly requested, it was, nevertheless, a waste of time
for all concerned. 2
Another wasteful feature of the Code, perpetuated in
the 1920 Civil Practice Act, was the necessity of securing
a preliminary order requiring the respondent to file a return
to the petition. This was nothing more than a formality,
in most cases, in the nature of an order to show cause, and
moreover, was not an essential paper in the proceeding,
as was the petition. 3
The procedure whereby the petition could be challenged
on a point of law in certiorari was not expressly provided
for. In mandamus there were varying provisions in regard
to alternative and peremptory mandamus; in the latter case,
although a question of law was primarily presented for
determination in the first instance, no practice machinery
existed for challenging the petition for legal insufficiency.
In addition, no time limit was prescribed for raising a legal
objection. 4
The Report of the Judicial Council observed that "the
provisions governing the separate proceedings duplicate each
other on many points," and could be greatly reduced by
combining the features common to all of them-"
Several differences existed in regard to the two proceedings which the Report found particularly unnecessary:
(1) although the certiorari statute prescribes when the
remedy may be invoked and the specific questions to be
determined by the court, there are no corresponding provisions in this regard for mandamus; (2) in mandamus,
the statement of facts in the petition and the return are
subject to the provisions of law governing a complaint and
answer, but there is no corresponding requirement in regard
to certiorari; (3) certiorari is required to be instituted
92 Id. at 160-61.

93 Id. at 161.
94 Id.at 161-62.
95Id. at 162.
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within four months after the determination to be reviewed
becomes final, while there is no time limit for mandamus;
(4) while there is a provision for a stay where a certiorari
proceeding is brought, there is none prescribed for mandamus; (5) although failure to make a return may constitute a contempt in certiorari or mandamus, there is no
provision for granting a final order by default; (6) no
reply affidavits are allowed in mandamus and certiorari,
although authorized in prohibition.96
Another injustice of long standing had been the rule
that a return in a certiorari proceeding was conclusive as
to the facts. A party's only remedy was by a separate
action against a respondent for making a false return. It
was not even clear that if a petitioner prevailed in the
action for a false return that he could thereafter institute
another certiorari proceeding based upon the new, corrected
state of facts. Mandamus had long discarded this archaic
concept of conclusiveness, and there was no reason at this
time to continue the distinction between the remedies in
that respect. The complicated suit for damages could hardly
provide adequate recompense in such a case. 7
Thus there was a need for greater flexibility in the
procedure to permit summary disposition in favor of either
party where the facts and the law indicated that a proper
determination could be made expeditiously.9
The circuitous procedure whereby questions of fact raised
in mandamus must be determined at Trial Term and then,
after a verdict or decision is rendered, the proceeding is
shifted back to Special Term for definitive disposition, was
wbolly unncessary and made only for needless delay.99
In mandamus, the petitioner was seriously prejudiced if
he should fail to join a necessary party, whereas a more
liberal rule prevailed on the certiorari side. There was
no sound reason why they should not be uniformly liberal
in this respect."'
96

Id.
Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
1 00 Id.
97
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There was a lack of clarity and an undue limitation
in the provision for the recovery of damages in a mandamus
proceeding. In addition, it was not certain that damages
could be recovered at all if a peremptory mandamus had
been sought in the first instance, although the courts later
construed the provision to authorize imposition of damages. 10 1
Because the distinctions between the form of the remedies had been stressed so strongly in judicial opinions,
the petitioner who succeeded in overturning an administrative
determination by certiorari was forced to resort, someto secure enforcement of the newly
times, to mandamus
10 2
won right.
The overly complicated and confusing provisions of
mandamus and certiorari, resulting in frequent injustice
where narrow technicalities were applied, stood fully revealed in the comprehensive bill of particulars prepared by
the Judicial Council. Copious case citations fortified each
position taken in regard to criticism directed against existing
practices. Immediate results followed this irrefutable presentation to the legislature of the defects in these procedures. In the very year of its submission, 1937, the
mandamus, certiorari and prohibition provisions of the Civil
Practice Act were repealed and the recommendations of the
Twenty-four
Judicial Council adopted almost in toto. 3
sections of the new article 78 were substituted for the
seventy-four sections of the former separate articles on
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.
ARTcICLE 78 PROCMDINGS

The best description of what was accomplished by the
revision of 1937 is given in the Fourth Annual Report
of the Judicial Council:
The entirely new Article 78 which was enacted abolishes the former
separate forms required in the proceedings of certiorari to review,
101 Id. at 171-72.
102 Id. at 173.
103 N.Y. Sess.

Laws 1937, ch. 526. CCP Article 78, §§ 1283-1312 (relating
to certiorari), article 79, §§ 1313-40 (relating to mandamus), article 80,
§§ 1341-55 (relating to prohibition) were repealed. They are replaced by
CPA article 78 (entitled Proceeding Against a Body or Officer).
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mandamus and prohibition, and as was done one hundred years ago
with the forms of action, a litigant hereafter need only set forth his
facts and his prayer
for relief and such relief as is proper may
10 4
be given to him.

The opening provision of the new article 78, section
1283, abolished "the classifications, writs, and orders of
certiorari to review, mandamus and prohibition. . . . The

relief heretofore obtained by such writs or orders shall
hereafter be obtained as provided in this article." The
section provides that reference in a statute to certiorari,
mandamus or prohibition shall be deemed to refer to the
proceeding authorized by article 78. The Council's comment on this section is modest, for it states that it "makes
no change in the present substantive law as to the right to
relief" in regard to these various remedies, "but establishes
a uniform procedure for obtaining such relief." 101 However,
the legal terminology associated for several centuries with
certain usages was now entirely swept away in the abolition
of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, or so it was
supposed. There is no doubt thatnew, broader concepts
could be forged now that the restrictive terminology confining the remedies had been dropped, despite the disclaimer
of the Council.
In section 1284, which contains the definitions for the
article, the supplanted section of the former article on
certiorari was drawn upon. "To review a determination"
is given a broad scope to encompass relief theretofore available in a certiorari or mandamus proceeding to review the
act, or refusal to act, of a body or officer exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial, administrative or corporate functions which
involves an exercise of judgment or discretion. Judicial
and nonjudicial action are brought together in this section
on definitions because, in the Council's opinion, "similar
questions are involved in the review of all three types of
determinations which should be afforded uniform treatinent.,,os
104 1938 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No 48, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
COUNCIL
19.
105
THnRP
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106Id. at 181.
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Relief theretofore available in mandamus or prohibition
are comprehended in the remaining definitions of this section
which the Council repeats is,
only a codification of the present substantive law as to the right to
relief in which are now known as certiorari, mandamus and prohibition proceedings. . . The only purpose of the differentiation
between the three types of relief is to enable special treatment to be

accorded to particular cases where necessary, within the uniform
framework. There is no intention to preserve the distinctions now
drawn between the remedies of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. No matter which type of relief the petitioner seeks, the procedure to be10 7 followed under the new article will, on the whole,
be the same.

Relief under article 78 is not available to review a
determination made in a civil action or special proceeding
by a court of record; nor, where it was made in a criminal
matter except criminal contempt of court; nor, where it
is not a final determination; nor, where it can be adequately
reviewed by appeal to a court or to some body or officer;
nor, where the body or officer making the determination is
authorized by statute to re-hear the matter, with certain
other qualifications on re-hearing. 03 The Council notes that
these limitations are nothing more than a rearrangement
of existing provisions."'
For the first time, proceedings in the nature of mandamus are made subject to a time limitation, i.e., four
months, 1 0 the same period which had been applicable to
certiorari since the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure
in 1880. The disabilities of non-age, insanity and criminal
incarceration are included in this same section and the
time for bringing a proceeding in such instances is enlarged
from twenty months to two years. The Council notes that
"no change in the present law as to the necessity of a
demand in mandamus is intended.""'
107 Id. at 181-82.
108 CPA § 1285.
109 THiRD ANNUAL REPORT 182.
10 CPA § 1286.
211 TimR ANNUAL REPoRT 183.
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Provision is made as to venue and parties respondent. 112
The new statutes provided that:
The application for relief shall be founded upon a petition, verified
as in an action, which shall contain a plain and concise statement of
the material facts on which the petitioner relies, may be accompanied
by affidavits and other written proof, and shall demand the relief
to which the petitioner
supposes himself entitled, in the alternative
l3
or otherwise."
The Council remarks that "the task of determining the issue
will be made easier for the court if only the material facts
are alleged in the petition, and the evidentiary facts are set
forth in the accompanying papers." 114
Eight days notice of application for relief shall be
served upon respondent unless a shorter time is prescribed
by order to show cause granted by the court. At least two
days prior to the return date, unless a different time is
fixed in the order to show cause, the respondent shall serve
and file a verified answer which must contain proper denials,
and statements of new material, as in an action, and
must set forth such facts as may be pertinent and material
to show the grounds of the action taken which is complained
of. A certified transcript of the record of proceedings subject to review shall also be annexed to the answer and the
respondent shall also submit affidavits or other written proof
showing the existence of evidentiary facts as shall entitle
respondent to a trial of'any issue of fact." 5
The Council states that the term "answer" has been
substituted for that of "return" in the interest of achieving
uniformity and simplicity between the proceedings subsumed
under the new article and that of actions. Sometimes review
by certiorari has not involved the taking of testimony under
oath in judicial fashion, and consequently the "pertinent
and material" facts referred to in this section are derived,
in part, from applicable provisions in the General City
Law, the Village Law, the Town Law and the former Greater
New York Charter."'
The purpose of requiring affidavits
112 CPA §§ 1287, 1291.

113 CPA § 1288.
114

THmn
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115 CPA §§ 1289, 1291.
116 Applicable statutory citations are noted in THIRD
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186.
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or other written proof with the answer is to enable the
court to make a summary disposition of the matter, comparable to summary judgment under Rule 113 of the Rules
of Civil Practice.'1 7
To do away with the harsh rule of the conclusiveness
of the return in the former certiorari article, provision is
made for reply by the petitioner. In this manner he can
"dispute any matter, other than denials, set forth in the
answer, or the accuracy or completeness of the transcript
of the record of proceedings annexed to the answer .
which may be accompanied by affidavits or other written
proof." 118 The Council explains that this provides a broader
opportunity to submit additional proof after the answer
and it will also facilitate a summary disposition of the
matter." 9 But petitioner's failure to serve a reply in
regard to new matter in the answer constituted an admission, sometimes decisive of the suit. This created a new
pitfall for unwary suitors, however correct its logic.
The existing law was continued in allowing the respondent to raise objections in point of law warranting
dismissal of the petition by setting them forth in his answer
or applying to the court on the return day for such relief.
Provision is also made allowing the petitioner to move on
the return day to strike out the defense of new matter on
20
the ground of insufficiency in law.1
On the return day, if no triable issue of fact is duly
raised by the pleadings and accompanying papers, the court
shall forthwith render such final order as the case requires.
If a triable issue of fact is duly raised, it shall be determined
by a court or before a referee, except where the proceeding
is one to review a determination or to compel performance
of a duty specifically enjoined by law, proceedings which
are in the nature of mandamus, a jury trial may be had
if properly requested. 1 ' Proceedings in the appellate division will not be considered here.
117

Ibid.

118 CPA § 1292.
1 19

120
121
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The Council indicates that section 1295 is "almost
wholly new." It empowers the court to dispose of the cause
summarily as in an action under Rule 113 of the Rules
of Civil Practice and retains the provisions for a jury trial
in a proceeding which is in the nature of mandamus because
of constitutional requirements that a right to a jury trial
shall remain inviolate where theretofore afforded. The jury
trial provision is also extended, for the first time, to proceedings in the nature of certiorari,'2 2 presumably in those
cases where a quasi-judicial determination was made without
the formalities which attended judicial proceedings in the
courts.
Section 1296 is the heart of article 78 because it
defines the, scope of review for questions brought before
the court. These are:
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

122

Whether the respondent failed to perform a duty
specifically enjoined upon him by law;
Whether the respondent, if a body or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, is proceeding or is about to proceed without or in excess
of jurisdiction;
Whether the respondent, if a body or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative or corporate functions, had jurisdiction of the subject
matter of a determination under review;
Whether the Authority conferred upon the respondent in relation to that subject matter has
been pursued in the mode required by law in order
to authorize him to make the determination;
Whether, in making the determination, any rule
of law affecting the rights of the parties thereto
has been violated to the prejudice of the petitioner.
Where the determination under review was made
as the result of a hearing held and at which the
evidence was taken, pursuant to statutory direction,
the following questions shall also be determined;

THIRD

ANNUAL REPORT

188.
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Whether there was any competent proof of all the
facts necessary to be proved in order to authorize
the making of the determination.
If there was such proof, whether upon all the
evidence, there was such a preponderance of proof
against the existence of any of those facts that the
verdict of a jury, confirming the existence thereof,
rendered in an action in the supreme court triable
by a jury, would be set aside by the court as against
the weight of evidence.

Although the Council states that this section is almost
wholly new, 123 five out of seven subdivisions, i.e., subsections 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 were taken in haec verba from
former Section 1304 of the Civil Practice Act, which, in
turn, derived them from Section 2140 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, in the certiorari article. The last portion of
section 1296, not set forth above, is, however, new material.
Subsection 1, of section 1296 is derived in large measure
from the unadopted Field Code of 1850, section 1283. It
codifies the traditional basis for resort to mandamus relief,
based upon a right to mere ministerial action. Subsection
2 relates to proceedings in the nature of prohibition. Significant changes were effected by the addition of subsections
3, 4 and 5 to the class of questions for determination upon
a proceeding brought in the nature of mandamus. Before
this time, Code practice and the 'Civil Practice Act contained no provision defining scope of review for mandamus.
It was now fully released from the bonds of its narrow
traditional purpose. The courts had laid the groundwork
for this change several decades earlier in ameliorating the
narrow application of mandamus.'2 4 In the interest of
reducing expense, saving time and work, the issues under
subdivisions 3, 4 and 5 which formerly had to be referred
to the appellate division in certiorari proceedings, could
now be decided at special term in certain instances as
questions of law. The full machinery of the appellate
123Id. at 190.

124 People ex rel. Lodes v. Department of Health, 189 N.Y. 187, 82 N.E.
187 (1907); People ex rel. Empire City Trotting* Club v. State Racing
Comm'n, 190 N.Y. 31, 82 N.E. 723 (1907).
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division did not have to be placed in motion where a
certiorari-type proceeding could be disposed of summarily.
The Council also notes that "the last paragraph changes
the present law as to the conclusiveness of a return in
certiorari." 125 This portion of section 1296 has not been
quoted, but it is noteworthy that the provisions of section
1292, dealing with the reply, also conduced to the same
result.
There are further provisions regarding proceedings
1 26
upon default, bringing in of third parties, and stays.
In the final order to be awarded, the court is given
authority to grant the relief to which it deems the petitioner entitled; to dismiss the proceeding on the merits
or with leave to renew; if the proceeding was brought to
review a determination, as in certiorari, to annul or
confirm, wholly or partly, or modify the determination
reviewed and may direct appropriate action or inaction by
the respondent. Power to award a restitution and damages
where just and proper, is granted. 27
The Council notes that the first sentence of section
1300 is new, designed to allow the court to award or withhold relief in its discretion, according to the nature and the
merits of the case. The court's power in regard to a
determination is derived directly from the language of former
Section 1305 of the Civil Practice Act, and the last clause,
referred to above, obviates the need for a proceeding in the
nature of mandamus after a party has prevailed in regard
to a certiorari-type proceeding. Restitution is now made
available in mandamus-type proceedings and the provision
for awarding damages is freed from outmoded restrictions
and technicalities.
Costs and fines are perpetuated in the same amounts
and under the same conditions as they existed in the nineteenth century.'2 8 Enforcement of the final order and stay12
of proceedings pending appeal are also provided for. 1
125 THIRD ANNUAL REPORT
126 CPA
1297-99.

§§

127 CPA
128
129

CPA
CPA

§ 1300.

§§ 1301-02.
§§ 1303, 1305.

190.
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Unless otherwise ordered by the court, an appeal from an
intermediate order in a proceeding under article 78 can
only be taken in conjunction with an appeal from the final
order made therein. 130 The Council states that this is a
new provision calculated "to prevent delay in the disposition
of the cause on its merits." "I' The provisions of law
governing actions are made applicable to proceedings under
article 78 as far as possible, which is a reiteration of the
existing rule.
The provisions of article 78 have been strengthened since
its enactment by several amendments. The most notable
change was the addition of subsection 5-a to section 1296,
vesting the court with authority to review a penalty, discipline or punishment imposed by an administrative body or
officer.'3 2 It would appear that adequate authority to annul
or modify the measure of punishment already existed in
article 78,... but case law had ruled otherwise.'3 4
The new article 78 achieved a minor miracle, in its
way, by clearing away the accumulation of centuries of
procedural technicalities, superimposed upon each other,
perhaps needful in the days of prerogative writ infancy,
but impeding the machinery of justice in any age moving
at a rapid tempo under greatly matured concepts of law.
It ranks as high, or perhaps higher, than the Code of 1880
which had also achieved a signal breakthrough in establishing
procedure for judicial review of official action by placing
such review on a full statutory basis. Whereas the earlier
Code synthesized existing widely scattered, disparate common-law rules, decisions and procedures into a comprehensive
system, the achievement of article 78 rests in the abolition
of the prerogative writ system and terminology. An authority has described this system as a method "cunningly planned
for the evil purpose of thwarting justice and maximizing
fruitless litigation." '3 5
130 CPA § 1304.
31
1
THnw AxuAL REPORT 194.
132 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 661.
133 Cf. CPA § 1300.
'84 Barsky v. Regents, 305 N.Y. 89, 111 N.E.2d 222 (1953); Sagos v.
O'Connell, 301 N.Y. 212, 93 N.E.2d 644 (1950).
135 3

DAvis, ADMII4sRAhw

LAW

TzATsE

§ 24.01

(1958).
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Quite apart from removing the booby traps of the
multiple prerogative remedies and reducing the practice to
simplicity itself, article 78 strengthened the weakest part
of the former writ procedures in the new composite statute
by infusing it with the best portions of each of the old.
For example, where the courts had exercised a free hand
in respect to the time required for instituting mandamus
proceedings, the rule of the four month limitation applicable
to certiorari was invoked for both. The fair play and
jurisdiction standards expressly governing only certiorari by
statute were now extended to proceedings in the nature of
mandamus.18 6
Before this, there were no substantive standards in the
mandamus article and litigants were obliged to muster com
mon-law precedents for support in presenting a case in
court, with no assurance that they would be applied with
the uniformity and the certainty which a statutory directive
commands. Conversely, the return in a proceeding in the
nature of certiorari was now no longer conclusive upon the
petitioner, an injustice which had been rectified much earlier
in mandamus; the damages provision in mandamus was
broadened and made applicable to both types of pro37
ceedings,1
an area which still remains to be exploited to
its fullest extent in article 78. What particularly emerges
is the enhancement of safeguards for the less formal proceedings of administrative bodies or officers which were
previously applicable only to certiorari-type proceedings.
Certain distinctive features inherent in the nature of
8
certiorari as a mode of appellate review were retained,1
while the free-wheeling nature of mandamus to adapt itself
to new circumstances is made implicit in the single provision
89
which is exclusively applicable to that type of proceeding.
Common law principles emanating from case law can nourish
that growth and allow it to extend the reach of its remedial
purposes wherever needed. Where certiorari was treated in
a static maianer retaining its basic function as an appeal,
mandamus was allowed to serve more like an action on
136 CPA §§ 1296(3), (5).

§ 1300.
138CPA §1296(6), (7).
189 CPA § 1296(1).
137 CPA
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the case, which completes a cycle because these different
concepts now ironically return to their respective commonlaw origins.
It is evident that although article 78 overhauled and
wiped out many shortcomings of the separate, confusing
mandamus and certiorari proceedings, it was not intended
and could not qualify as the panacea to cure the enduring
problems of judicial review of administrative action.
It achieved a major break-through in bringing a
remedy, increasingly important to the public, to a point
of simplicity by eliminating pitfalls, hazards and technicalities, and expediting a decision on the merits. It truly
represents the work of many unseen hands from Field
through Throop, and from Fiero to The Judicial Council.
The latter wove the many threads which predecessors had
originated into an integrated mechanism. Field was the
proponent of a short, simple -Code; Throop, however ineptly,
undertook and carried through the enormous task of codifying the common law rules of writ procedure; Fiero advocated consolidation of the provisions common to all the
writs, of eliminating the alternative and peremptory writs
of mandamus and of assimilating the practice in actions
as much as possible; the 1915 Board of Statutory Consolidation was the most ardent advocate of simplification to
the point of converting the writs into actions, and thereby
abolishing the terms, mandamus, certiorari and prohibition.
The Judicial Council carried its major suggestions through
to completion by the force of a closely documented study.
This recapitulation of the progress achieved by article 78
does not mean that it has brought us to the millennium in
judicial review of administrative action. Robert M. Benjamin, a Moreland Commissioner under Section 8 of the
Executive Law of the State of New York, only a few years
after the adoption of article 78, observed in his notable
report to the governor, that the use of the language in
section 1296, subsection 7, applicable to juries in a trial
was not suitable for defining scope of review of administrative determinations. 1 0 He also urged that in the inter14 0

BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE AxJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEw YORK

340 (1942).
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est of conforming to current usage and understanding as
practiced in the courts, subsections 6 and 7 of section 1296
be combined into a single section, employing the phrase
"substantial evidence" to describe the test for weighing
action taken by an administrative body pursuant to a
statutory hearing.4
These subsections, borrowed from
Section 2140 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and derived
originally from one decision at General Term,' 42 and another
in the Court of Appeals, 14 3 have lost their original value
at this date when judicial opinions have become more
sophisticated in defining the scope of such review as the
test of substantial evidence. Adventitious judicial decisions
had, through the inertia of codifiers and revisers, maintained a dominant and sometimes confusing position in
judicial review of administrative determinations long after
they had outlived their usefulness. In mitigation, it should
be stated that the revisers of article 78 did not undertake
to innovate, but only to integrate and simplify. Commissioner Benjamin's suggestion has been incorporated
into the new Civil Practice Law and Rules which went
into effect September 1, 1963.' M
For similar reasons, where a term or a phrase has
attained wide currency in judicial olinions, such as "arbitrary or capricious," this should become part of the statutory terminology governing the scope of review even though
it may actually represent mere judicial shorthand for one
or more sub-sections of Section 1296 of the Civil Practice
Act. A more serious omission in the statute is the failure
to specifically a-dthorize remand by the court for partial,
specified or de novo determination, although some agency
statutes so provide.'4 5 Several agency statutes, Commissioner Benjamin points out, provide for judicial review by
certiorari despite the fact that quasi-judicial hearings are
141 Id. at 339.
142 People ex i-el. Crandall v. Overseers of the Poor, 15 Barb. 286 (1853);

see also People ex r-el. Haines v. Smith, 45 N.Y. 772, 777 (1871).
143 People ex tel. Cook v. Board of Police, 39 N.Y. 506 (1868).
144 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 308; CPLR §7803(4).
145 N.Y. LAB. LAW § 111(3) (State Board of Standards and Appeals);
§ 707(2) (Labor Relations Act); N.Y. UNCONSO; LAws § 8589 L. McKINNEY
1961) (Rent Control).
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not held, which creates an apparent anomaly. He resolves
that question by invoking that part of section 1296 which
prescribes certiorari-type review only after a hearing held
"pursuant to statutory direction," and he notes that section
1283 has abolished the category of certiorari altogether.
Therefore, he holds, this type of determination would be
subject to mandamus-type review under article 78.146
Commissioner Benjamin also observes that the definitions and the categories of administrative action made
subject to article 78, as laid down in sections 1284 and 1296,
have not been sufficiently utilized by the courts in their
decisions.' 47 It would appear to be helpful if the language
of the statute were more extensively employed by counsel
and court to lay the basis for establishing a coherent body
of law emanating from the categories specified in the statute,
as construed by the courts. Perhaps the terminology employed in these categories is outmoded and has thereby failed
to gain acceptance on its own merits.
Although the adoption of article 78 must be considered
a victory in light of the long prior inaction, this has not
been altogether complete because part of its achievement has
been slowly whittled away by judicial construction. The
Court of Appeals has held that article 78 was not intended
to abrogate the relief previously available by the writs which
were abolished, but only "to wipe out technical distinctions
which had been a snare for suitors." 4s It was further
indicated that the nature of the alleged grievance will
continue to govern "the form of hearing before the court
• . . the questions to be determined at such hearing, and
the relief which the court has the power to grant." This
would appear to have reinstated mandamus and certiorari
to full primacy in everything but name. Although subsequent cases in the Court of Appeals have confirmed this
position, 14 9 the restoration of mandamus and certiorari as
BEJAmim, op. cit. supra note 140, at 359-60.
147Id. at 351-52.
148 Newbrand v. City of Yonkers, 285 N.Y. 164, 174 33 N.E2d 75, 80
146

(1941).
149 Gimprich v. Bd. of Educ., 305 N.Y. 401, 406, 118 N.E.2d 578 (1954);
Toscano v. McGoldrick, 300 N.Y. 156, 161, 89 N.E2d 873, 875 (1950);
Newbrand v. City of Yonkers, 285 N.Y. 164, 174, 33 N.E.2d 75, 80 (1941).
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distinct types of proceedings is impossible under article
78.15
However, a retreat from the progress achieved by
article 78 is evident as a result of these Court of Appeals
decisions, and by the increasing reference to certiorari and
mandamus in the opinions of current court decisions. Where
a petitioner presents a grievance under one of the categories
specified in section 1296, the courts have proceeded to
determine his rights under article 78, but much of the
rhetoric associated with the writs has crept back into judicial
opinions.151
What the Court of Appeals actually ruled in these
cases was that the limited objective of article 78 in effecting
certain procedural reforms did not alter the basic questions
which the courts must consider in determining whether
relief is to be awarded under article 78.
CVIL PRACTCE LAW AND RUims
The advent of a new code of practice, the Civil Practice
Law and Rules 52 (hereinafter referred to and cited as
CPLR) has provided an unexpected opportunity for taking
stock of the impact of the changes wrought by article 78
in 1937, and offers the chance to again weed out outmoded
and timeworn statutory formulae and to overhaul conflicting
and confusing provisions.
The latest revisers state that the new practice code
"has left the underlying law dealing with the prerogative
writs intact, restricting its efforts to a simplification and
clarification of present provisions." 153 Such modest disclaimers are not always to be taken too seriously. For one,
the twenty-four sections of the Civil Practice Act have
been reduced to a mere six in the CPLR through considerable combination and elimination of subject matter.
Unquestionably, the statutory guidelines have been
shortened, leaving greater scope to judicial discretion and
invention. This has always characterized prerogative law,
150 CPA § 1283.
151 See GELz.roRw & BYsE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 372 (1st ed. 1954).
152 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 308, as amended.
153 1958 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 13, SECOND PRELIMINARY RE'oRr OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRACICE AND PROCEDURE 395. Cf. THIW ANNUAL
REPORT 19.
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and should so remain. The rigidity and constraints of
statute hardly offer the flexibility which is necessary to
keep pace -with the expanding facets of government activity
and the ever-changing concepts in regard thereto.
The benefits reaped by the revision of 1937, in abolishing
mandamus, certiorari and prohibition, are retained in the
opening lines of section 7801. That section likewise sets
forth the substantive limitations for recourse to article 78
review much as they previously existed.
Although the phrase "interested persons" is not defined or elaborated in section 7802(d), it is unsafe to assume
that the modifying terms "specially and beneficially" of the
parallel Civil Practice Act section 154 will not be followed in
most circumstances, inasmuch as the concept of "standing"
is not susceptible of serious modification in the absence of
specific statutory alteration by agency statute.
The major feature of the article 78 revision, section
7803, dealing with scope of review, has compressed eight
sections of the corresponding Section 1296 of the Civil
Practice Act into a mere four in the CPLR. The main
accomplishment is that practice and theory have been brought
together in subsection 3 by the inclusion of "arbitrary and
capricious" as a test upon judicial review. This addition
reflects the widespread use of that phrase by the courts over
a considerable period of time in describing improper or
unreasonable administrative action, of a nonjudicial nature.
However, the inclusion of "abuse of discretion" as an additional standard or test in this subdivision is entirely
superfluous, and to a great extent will tend to confuse.
It introduces a confusing element upon judicial review because "abuse of discretion" is most commonly applied
to describe action of a judicial tribunal, properly speaking.
It thereby tends to assimilate the action of a judicial
tribunal to that of an administrative body or officer, whereas,
in fact, they perform different functions, under disparate
auspices. In a word, "abuse of discretion" adds little or
nothing to the concept covered by "arbitrary and capricious"
action, but may tend to mislead some courts into believing
154 CPA

§ 1298.
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that administrative action is to be judged much the same
as judicial action. Inasmuch as judicial-type action is not
even contemplated as falling within the scope of subsection
3, it being within the purview of subsection 4, this innovation becomes all the more questionable. The mere fact
that it has cropped up in some judicial opinions is hardly
a warrant for its adoption as a statutory standard.
The introduction of "substantial evidence" as a test in
scope of review represents an important and long-needed
step forward in this area.'5 5 The outmoded tests for adjudging the validity of judicial-type administrative action
according to standards applied to jury verdicts should have
been discarded a long time ago. Now we have the plain
requirement that such administrative action must measure
up to the minimum standards of quality (competence) and
quantity (weight) of evidence established in decisions of
the appellate division 156 and the Court of Appeals. 157 And
thereby, the legal residuum rule, 5 ' which never entered the
mainstream of our decisions on scope of review, has now
finally been relegated to merited discard.
Taking cognizance of the realities of contemporary
practice which reflects the importance of the rights involved,
the eight days' notice of hearing requirement of the 'Civil
Practice Act, 159 assimilated to that of motion practice, has
now been extended to a full twenty days, 6 ° as in an action.
The time requirements for subsequent steps in the proceeding
have been commensurately extended.' 6' A new departure
in the century-long statutory history of prerogative proceedings is the right of the respondent to now plead a
counterclaim. 162
Time alone will determine whether a
155 CPLR §7803(4).
See also text at
supra. This will also conform to the prevailing practice in the Federal jurisdiction.
156 See, e.g., In the Matter of Phinn v. Kross, 8 App. Div. 2d 132, 186
N.Y.S.2d 469 (1st Dep't 1959).
157 See, e.g., Humphrey v. State Ins. Fund, 298 N.Y. 327, 83 N.E.2d 539
(1949); Stork Restaurant v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 26 N.E.2d 247 (1940).
158 Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916):
Reynolds v. Triboro Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 276 App. Div. 388, 94 N.Y.S.2d
841 (1st Dep't 1951).
159 CPA § 1289.
160 CPLR § 7804(c).
161 Ibid.
162 CPLR § 7804(d).
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functional purpose will be served by this provision; it was
prohibited in the Civil Practice Act.1 0
The remaining procedural provisions of section 7804
largely follow the Civil Practice Act except that it is silent
on the right to trial by jury of an issue of fact."'
The judgment provisions 15 are closely aligned to the
statutory language of the corresponding section of the Civil
Practice Act,10 6 with one notable exception. It is now
specified that the award of restitution or damages can only
be subsidiary to the primary relief granted to petitioner,
and must.be such as could be recoverable on the same facts
in a supreme court action or proceeding. This additional
proviso seems to impose conditions not required in the
parallel section of the Civil Practice Act and may render
the recovery of monetary damages somewhat more difficult
than before.
There is complete silence in this last section of article
78 in regard to a practice now widely followed by the
courts, i.e., remand. Although some agency statutes provide
for remand,'6 7 and courts have frequently remanded on their
own initiative without the benefit of statutory authorization,
such widespread practice, exemplifying a need, should be
accorded statutory recognition and control.
If any doubt existed heretofore on the score of allowing
discovery in an article 78 proceeding, it is now resolved
by Section 408 of the CPLR. It is only required that the
parties proceed by court order in all cases except for a notice
to admit under section 3123, where the parties may proceed
by notice alone. This device can eventually become a valuable instrument for "fleshing out" a case where the petitioner has a limited knowledge of the facts in possession
of the respondent at the time of the commencement of the
proceeding.
CPA § 1291.
CPLR § 7804(h); CPA §1295; but see CPLR § 410, applicable to all
special proceedings, where trial by jury is authorized. In like manner, the
four-month limitation for bringing an article 78 is not contained in the
revised article but is found in § 217; the former tolling provisions of CPA
§ 1286 are now found in CPLR § 208.
163

164

-15CPLR § 7806.
166 CPA § 1300.
167 See note 145 supra.
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CONCLUSION

Of necessity, assessment of the new provisions of Article
78 in the CPLR has been gauged narrowly due to the need
for implementation by judicial decision. But with another
statutory revision of prerogative law upon us it is well
to take stock of what has been achieved by legislative action
in this area in the past. This branch of our law has
travelled a long road, deriving basic principles from the
English common law and erecting an ad hoc system of
indigenous law upon that foundation by a century of judicial
decision. Ultimately, this body of decisional law was codified
and then over a period of another century, it was successively consolidated and clarified by a series of statutory
enactments.
Initial legislative intervention in the late
nineteenth century became imperative when all other
measures, including judicial innovation, were found unequal
to the task of establishing clear and definitive rules of
law and procedure. This was especially true of certiorari
decisional law.
In our own generation we have witnessed a virtual
revolution whereby the ancient writs of certiorari, mandamus
and prohibition were consigned to oblivion, if we accept
the plain mandate of Section 1283 of the Civil Practice
Act. In other respects, however, statutory revision, apart
from codification, has hardly succeeded in serving more than
a stop-gap for dealing with problems in this area; it did
not seem to have the capacity to reach the deep-rooted
problems.
The larger task still remains, and that is for the courts
to exercise their common-law powers to the fullest extent
so that the remedies of article 78 are brought to the side
of every just grievance. It is the lesson of our experience
with legislation that statutory procedures cannot be expected to meet the day-to-day problems in this area. We
do know that difficult problems in New York administrative
law can be resolved by judicial decision. 6
The courts
should continue to call upon the innate resources of the
common law in meeting the difficult problems which lie
ahead in this constantly expanding branch of our law.
168 See, e.g., Mitthauer v. Patterson, 8 N.Y.2d 37, 167 N.E.2d 731, 201
N.Y.S.2d 321 (1960).

